North Korea - why China ain't gonna rock the boat.

I write as the Western World wags its finger at Kim Jeong Eun and co for attempting to fire a rocket into orbit, which they claim was to celebrate the 100 years anniversary of the birth of the country’s founder, Kim Il Sung. Although the rocket launch was a failure, the fact that North Korea could even attempt it, despite universal international condemnation, shows just how little traction anyone has over Pyongyang.

Looks nice. Didn't work though.

Coincidentally, last week I attended a talk by esteemed Russian academic Andrei Lankov on the topic of “What does China want in North Korea, and what can be done about it?”. So it seems a fitting time for me to say a few words about how these different events and actors relate to one another, and especially why China behaves as it does to the DPRK – seemingly, letting it get away with murder, both figuratively and literally.

Andrei Lankov is a Russian professor who has studied in Russia and North Korea.  He can speak Korean, English and his native Russian, and I think he can speak some Chinese too. He has some high-level diplomatic contacts in several governments in the region, and has about half a dozen books published to his name. The guy knows his stuff. His views on China were well-informed and illustrated with reference to history, to recent conversations he’s had with well-placed government sources in Beijing and Seoul, as well as non-governmental sources in North Korea.

I will be plagiarizing Lankov extensively here. If you take an interest, I suggest you read his books, or at the very least, check out his columns for the Korea Times.

China seems to be the only country with any kind of influence over North Korea, yet they seem unable or unwilling to really effect any change on their ally. Whereas, a generation ago, perhaps, this could be explained by Cold War strategic alliances, or an ideological bond based on a shared commitment to ‘communism’, these arguments now both seem obsolete – the Cold War is over, and China’s market economy seems a world apart from anything resembling Pyongyang’s version (or, for that matter, any version) of ‘Marxism’.

Crucially, Lankov argues that China’s influence over NK is often vastly overstated by the western media. In reality, NK often ignores China’s advice, and the relationship between the two countries is cordial but underscored with deep mistrust. Kim Il Sung’s ideology of ‘Juche’ is one of self-sufficiency and independence  - although one could convincingly argue that economic stagnation, famine, and a reliance on food aid and have showed that to be an utter failure - NK is suspicious of China and keen not to become its satellite or puppet. 

Kim Jong Il is overjoyed to meet China's Wen Jiabao. (2009)

 

So China can’t do much about North Korea, and, even if it could, it wouldn’t. Why? Well, Lankov argues that China’s attitude can be understood, not in terms of ideology, or even economic links, but in terms of strategic aims, which he describes as follows.

As Lankov put it, China has three key aims regarding North Korea:

1. Stability on the Korean peninsula
2. A divided peninsula
3. A non-nuclear peninsula

These aims are hierarchical: Aim 1 – stability, is the paramount aim, and China will sacrifice the other aims to maintain a stable Korean neighbour.  Likewise, China will sacrifice Aim 3, if it means Aims 2 and 1 can be maintained.

Look at the aims in reverse order, and things start to make a little more sense.

why China is interested in accessing the Korean East Coast

 Aim 3 – a non-nuclear peninsula - is important to China because China doesn’t trust the NK military with nuclear weapons, and, moreover, China wants to maintain its privileged position in the ‘Nuclear Club’, as one of only half a dozen nuclear states in the world. Also, China fears that if (or rather, when) the NK regime falls, nuclear materials could fall into the wrong hands.

However, if NK does become a nuclear-armed state (as looks increasingly likely), China would reluctantly accept that, if it meant that aims 1 and 2 were assured.

Aim 2: a divided peninsula - is important to China because China doesn’t want South Korean (and, more importantly, US) armed forces, near its border. North Korea is a handy buffer zone against its rival superpower, America.

Also, China gets some strategic advantages from the existence of North Korea, like access to its eastern coast, which is helpful for Chinese sea- exports (which otherwise have to travel a very long way – see the map). If Korea became reunified, China could not be assured of such access by a united Korea controlled from Seoul, rather than by its allies in Pyongyang.

But the main Aim, Aim 1 – stability on the peninsula, is China’s over-riding concern. However much China may be embarrassed by the belligerent actions of Pyongyang, it does not want to risk the total meltdown of the regime, fearing, probably rightly, that it would precipitate violence, chaos, and a flood of refugees over the Chinese border. In such a scenario, China’s Army might have to intervene. 

China does not want to intervene militarily in what might be a rather messy expedition into Korea which could be economically and politically costly, and the sight of Chinese tanks in a foreign country would be a PR disaster.

So, however much it dislikes it, China would accept a nuclear North Korea rather than risk the meltdown of the whole regime, which would lead to a united Korea and at least an interim period of instability – therefore meaning aims 1 and 2 would not be secured.

However, Lankov argues that China could accept the reunification of Korea, if a situation arose that meant it was unavoidable. If, for example, the NK regime failed, then China would probably not prevent South Korea from filling the vacuum of power, and unifying the peninsula, so as to stabilize the peninsula as soon as possible. 

This seems to echo some of the information which wikileaks has unearthed, that China (for the reasons mentioned earlier) would not want to involve its military in Korea, although they would probably seek assurances that the US military would keep a certain distance away from the China-Korea border.

Seen thus, it can be understood why China behaves as it does. It is unwilling to do anything which might endanger the Pyongyang government’s ability to survive. China could, theoretically at least, cut all trade links with NK, stop sending food aid and isolate Pyongyang politically. This could help precipitate some kind of overthrow of the Kim government. 

But, firstly, China is not in the business of regime change (as can be seen by their complete reluctance to get involved in the Arab Spring), and in the case of Korea, it wants to maintain its strategic aims, as outlined above. The status quo might not be perfect, but the alternatives, for China at least, are worse.

If change is to happen in North Korea, it is likely to come from within rather than be imposed from without.

But, more on that....later.